



A
VINDICATION

Of a late PAMPHLET entitled,
The CASE of the HANOVER TROOPS
considered, &c.



[Price ONE SHILLING.]



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Further

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Printed

A
VINDICATION

OF A LATE

PAMPHLET,

INTITLED,

The CASE of the HANOVER
TROOPS *considered:*

WITH SOME

Further OBSERVATIONS
upon those TROOPS;

BEING

A SEQUEL to the said Pamphlet.



LONDON:

Printed for T. COOPER, at the *Globe* in *Pater-*
noster-row.

MDCCLXIII.

VINDICATION

OF A LATE

P. A. M. P. H. E. T.

INTENDED

THE CASE OF THE HAWKERS

TROOPS OF THE

WITHIN

THE OBSERVATIONS

UPON THE TROOPS

IN 1786

A SECOND EDITION



LONDON

Printed by J. G. Smith, at the ...

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VINDICATION

Of a late PAMPHLET entitled,

The CASE of the HANOVER TROOPS
considered, &c.

A Late Pamphlet intituled, *The Case of the Hanover Troops considered*, has given such Offence to the new Part of the present Administration, that they have fulminated the most tremendous Menaces against the unknown Author, if they could but discover him, and have represented the Book as the Production of avowed and determined Jacobitism: The whole Scope and Tendency of it, say they, is to prove, that ever since the Accession of the present Royal Family to the Throne, the *Rudder of Hanover* has, in all foreign Affairs, steered the Vessel of *Great-Britain*; Therefore the present Royal Family is to be drove out, and the Pretend-

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er introduced in their Room. A most logical and constitutional Conclusion this! which I shall consider more fully presently, and to which, I shall now only return this short Answer: The Force of Truth on one Side, and the Consciousness of Guilt on the other, always produces Anger instead of Answer. Could the Facts have been disproved, or the Reasonings refuted, I presume, they would have been so: Neither can be done; Jacobitism, therefore, comes seasonably to supply these Defects, and is to be the trusty Auxiliary of the new, as it has long been of the old Part of the Administration.

I will fairly and candidly admit, that the Design of the Book is to prove, that since the Accession of the present Royal Family, *Hanover* has been the chief Spring of all our foreign Transactions. But even this *Æra*, it seems, is criminal. *Why only since the Accession of this Royal Family!* Pray could it have been so before, when *England* had no Connexion with *Hanover*? So that this *Æra* appears to be not only an innocent, but from the Nature of the Thing a necessary one.

The

The Book then proceeds to give a Deduction of Facts public and known, though possibly not enough attended to, Facts which a Review of the Gazettes and Treaties from the given Time will sufficiently evince the Truth of. I shall not here recapitulate them, or repeat the Arguments drawn from them, but shall only point out an equitable Rule for forming an impartial Judgment upon them, and then proceed to shew, that the Drift of the whole Book is not only loyal but salutary to the present Royal Family, honest and meritorious to the Public, and even useful to all *British* Ministers who mean well to their native Country.

All Matters of State, however public in general, by their Preparations or Events, have some secret Springs and Views which do not appear to the Bulk of Mankind, and consequently become Matter only of Reasoning and Conjecture; in order to form which Reasonings and Conjectures right, every wise Man compares the past with the present, considers the prevailing Turn and Spirit of the Court, and the personal Characters and predominant Passions of the Prince and his Ministers. If Reason and

good Policy do not shew the Fitness of a Measure, he seeks for the true Cause in the Interests, the Habits, and the Passions of it's Authors; and where these conspire to authorise his Conjecture, it is as well founded as Conjecture can be. For this Reason we see, that in all judicial Proceedings, where plain and positive Proofs are not to be had, great Stress is justly laid upon the Character of the Person accused: His usual Course of Life, his Habits, his Connexions, his natural Turn and Disposition, are strictly enquired into, and weigh greatly in his Condemnation or Acquittal.

By this Rule then let the Public judge of the Causes assigned for the several Facts stated in the Book, and of the Inferences drawn from them, and not be imposed upon by flat Denials of some Facts, false Assertions of others, groundless Invectives and stale Insinuations of Jacobitism.

I'll give an Example or two out of the Book: Immediately after the late King's Accession to the Crown, *Bremen* and *Verden* were purchased by him, as Elector of *Hanover*, of the King of *Denmark*, who had taken them from *Sweden* during the Absence of it's King, and who was glad to
sell

sell them before his Return, and, in Con-
 sideration of that Sale, to obtain the Gua-
 ranty of *England* for the Dutchy of *Sles-*
wick, which he had likewise taken from
 the Duke of *Holftein*. Soon after this
 250,000 Pounds were granted to his Ma-
 jesty by Parliament, under the poor Pre-
 tence of securing *England* against the dan-
 gerous Attempts of *Sweden*, an old Ally of
England, and at that Time, moreover, in
 so miserable and shattered a Condition, that
 it had every Thing to fear, and was in no-
 thing to be feared. *Hanover* had hitherto
 made no Purchases, and it is not probable
 would have begun with this, where the
 Purchase Money was so considerable and
 the Title so precarious, had not the Riches
 of *England* supplied the first, and the
 Strength of *England* secured the second.
 And can any Body doubt of the real Causes
 of all our subsequent Northern Fleets and
 Subsidies, for Operations, in which *Eng-*
land, as *England*, could not be the least
 concerned, and upon which the Fate of
Bremen and *Verden* solely and absolutely
 depended? Or, will it be sufficient for a
 Minister roundly to assert, that *Bremen* and
Verden were not bought by *British* Money,
 nor kept by *British* Strength? Surely not:
 The exact Concurrence of such and so
 many

many Circumstances will ever be a stronger Proof than a bare, however strong Denial.

The Affair of *Mecklenburgh* deserves some Notice too, as it will appear to have been, during fifteen or sixteen Years, one of the chief Springs of *British* Transactions upon the Continent, and one of the Causes of our several Quarrels with *Russia*, *Prussia*, and the Court of *Vienna*.

In 1442 a Family Compact was made between the Elector of *Brandenburgh* and the Duke of *Mecklenburgh*, by which, in Failure of Heirs Male of the latter, that Dutchy was to go to the Heirs Male of *Brandenburgh*.

This Treaty was approved by *Frederick III.* and the Electoral College, and was confirmed by the succeeding Emperors.

In 1708 he added the Arms of *Mecklenburgh* to his own, and took the Title of that Principality. The same Year he claimed the Acknowledgment of that Title, among his others, from the States General: They, upon his notifying his Marriage to them, in their Letters of Congratulation acknowledge the said Title.

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In 1708 the Duke of *Mecklenburgh's* Ministers present a Memorial to several Courts, in which he complains of his Nobility, and says, the Suit between him and them had been carrying on ever since 1664. He likewise complains of their having then obtained from the Imperial Court a *Protectorium*, directed to the King of *Sweden* as Director of the Circle of Lower *Saxony*, jointly with the Duke of *Wolfenbottle*, and separately from the Elector of *Hanover*.

That the King of *Prussia* and he were concerned in Interest, and that the former had lent him a Regiment of Dragoons.

The $\frac{12}{17}$ *March* 17 $\frac{16}{17}$ the Minister of the Czar presented a Memorial to his late Majesty on three very important Points—*Gyllemburg's* Plot and the Publishing the Letters that mention the Czar's Physician as concerned in it.—The making of a Peace with *Sweden*, and assisting it against *Russia* upon the Conditions of this Cession of *Bremen*, and the withdrawing of the Troops out of *Mecklenburgh*.

The Memorial sets forth, that the Czar was desirous of a Treaty with his Majesty,
and

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and to guaranty the *Hanover* Succession here, and says — “ And it was not the
 “ Fault of his Czarish Majesty, that the
 “ said Negotiation was not brought to an
 “ happy Conclusion. Although his Czarish Majesty has lately observed, that several contrary Steps have been taken by
 “ your Majesty’s Ministers in many foreign Courts, particularly at the Court of
 “ *Vienna*, and those of *Denmark* and
 “ *Prussia*, as well as at the Diet of *Ratisbon*, though his Czarish Majesty had
 “ given no Cause for such Measures, notwithstanding that he had sufficient Reasons
 “ to be upon his Guard, and to provide
 “ for his own Security, considering the general Reports, and the particular Advices he had had from many Places,
 “ that your Majesty is negotiating a separate Peace with *Sweden*, in which you
 “ promise your Assistance against his Czarish Majesty, upon the Condition of the Cession of *Bremen* and *Verden*, as it plainly
 “ appears by the Letters lately published
 “ of the *Swedish* Minister.”

An Answer was delivered to this Memorial, dated the 2d of *April*, N.S. 1717. which says,

“ As

“ As to the Complaints contained in
 “ that Memorial, of the Steps which his
 “ Majesty may have taken at several Courts
 “ in *Germany*, with Regard to the *Russian*
 “ Troops in the Empire, granting it to be
 “ true, that the *British* Ministers had acted
 “ with Vigour at the said Courts, in Order
 “ to procure the Evacuation of the said
 “ Troops, his Czarish Majesty ought not
 “ in the least to be surprized at it, con-
 “ sidering the strict Union which has so
 “ long subsisted between *Great-Britain*,
 “ the Emperor, and the Empire, which
 “ Union has been confirmed and strengthen-
 “ ed the last Year by a new Treaty of
 “ Alliance between the Emperor and the
 “ King.”

As to *Sweden* and the separate Peace with
 it, it says, “ *England* has nothing to do
 “ with that, because it was not at War
 “ with *Sweden*.”

Observe how much of this Dispute with
 the Czar is founded on the Treaty of 1716,
 which guarantees what by mutual Con-
 sent they shall acquire; and that this was
 before the Blow struck in the *Mediterra-
 nean*. And that the not assisting the late
 King in Consequence of these Engagements
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against *Russia* in Support of *Sweden* in 1720, was one of the Causes of the Difference with the Emperor, and of the Mischiefs that ensued.

On the 12th of *April*, 1717, on the Debate * for granting to his Majesty the Sum of 250,000 *l.* to enable him to concert Measures against *Sweden*, Mr. *Pulteney* said, " That having resigned his Place, he might act with the Freedom becoming an *Englishman*; and he could not forbear declaring against the granting a Supply in a Manner altogether unparliamentary and unprecedented; that he could not persuade himself, that any *Englishman* advised his Majesty to send such a Message; but doubted not but the Resolutions of a *British* Parliament would make a *German Ministry* tremble." My Lord *Finch*, eldest Son to the Earl of *Nottingham*, seconded Mr. *Pulteney*, and even found Fault with some Steps that had been taken in Relation to the Affairs of the North, saying, among other Things, " That it appeared, by the Memorial presented by the *Russian* Minister, and by the Answer which had been returned to the same,

* Debates in Parliament 1717, p. 471. Vol. 6.

" that

" that such Measures were pursued as were
 " like to engage us in a Quarrel with the
 " Czar." To which Mr. Stanhope said;
 " That as for the Instances which his Ma-
 " jesty has caused to be made with the
 " Czar, and the Measures he may have
 " concerted to get the *Russian* Troops out
 " of the Dutchy of *Mecklenburgh*, his
 " Majesty has acted in all this as Elector
 " and Prince of the Empire; that he was
 " persuaded all the Gentlemen here would
 " agree with him, that the King's Dignity,
 " as King of *Great-Britain*, was never un-
 " derstood to tie up his Hands with Re-
 " spect to his Interests in *Germany*, and as
 " Prince of the Empire." Compare this
 with the Memorials, and what has hap-
 pened since.

It is to be observed, that Mr. *Berensdorf*,
 at that time *premier Electoral Minister*, at
 least, had made great Purchases of Lands
 in *Mecklenburgh* at a very easy Rate, from
 the Distress that Country was then in, which
 was one of the Causes assigned for the Ne-
 gotiation then carrying on at the *Hague*,
 to force the Czar to evacuate *Mecklenburgh*.

The Czar was concerned, as a Relation,
 for the Duke of *Mecklenburgh*, and came

there at his Desire; he likewise was interested in the Affair of *Sleswick*, which was taken from his Relation the Duke of *Holstein*, and guaranteed to *Denmark* in Consideration of the Sale of *Bremen* and *Verden* to *Hanover*: The Czar had likewise above all offended *Hanover* in Respect of the taking of the Town of *Wismar*.

In this Situation the *Russian* Troops were at last got out of *Mecklenburgh* by those of *Hanover*, and the 25th of *October*, 1717, a Protectorial Commission was granted for *Mecklenburgh*, and the Elector of *Hanover* and the Duke of *Wolfenbüttele* were appointed Commissioners for the Execution of it, and laded it with Troops and Expence.

The Duke of *Mecklenburgh*, in his several Letters to the Diet at *Ratisbon**, and the several Princes of the Empire, charges the whole Affair as a Design of the House of *Lunenburgh* to make themselves absolute Masters of *Lower Saxony*.—That the Invasion of his Country by the Houses of *Hanover* and *Lunenburgh* was under Pretence of Decrees that were obtained from the Aulic

* *Roussset*, Vol. 7. p. 27, 30.

Council by Intrigues and Tricks; that the Damage they had done amounted to many Millions. That to have a firm Footing in his Estates, and to render themselves formidable, they had established Manufacturers and Directors, overturning thereby the fundamental Laws of the Empire.

* That the rebellious Opposition and Flight of his Nobility is owing to their being received, encouraged, maintained and protected for so many Years in the Countries of *Lunenburg*, the true Source and only Original of all the Troubles which have destroyed his Country, as likewise of the Invasion, Oppression, and Usurpation that has followed.

† That his Nobility and Subjects fled from his Country, and put themselves under the Protection of *Hanover*; which, as it was a concerted Design, not only received and protected them, but gave to every one of them 30 Crowns a Month for their Subsistence.

The *Hanoverians* being in Possession of the Country, maintained their Troops by

* p. 44.

† p. 54.

quartering,

quartering, had the whole Revenues of the Province under their Management, and in their Hands, yet they pretended, that vast Sums were due to them, though they would not give any authentic Accounts of what they had received, or of the liquidated Debt they retained.

But this was taken no Notice of till 1720, when the Affairs in the North took another Turn, when a Peace was made with *Sweden*, and we were all to fall on *Russia* as designed in 1711⁶; but the Emperor was so far from assisting in it as was expected, that he even crossed our Designs of eating up and gaining *Mecklenburgh*, by making, or letting it owe more to *Hanover* than it was worth; for it appears by the *Rescribatur* * of the Emperor, dated 8 of April 1728. to the Elector of *Hanover* and the Duke of *Wolfenbuttle*, where speaking of the Want of the Accompts of the Revenues, he says, " They have not been
" sent notwithstanding several Orders issued
" for that Purpose, and particularly those
" of the ‡ 23d of April and 23d September 1720. 13 April 1722. 22 January,
" and 15 July 1723. 8 June 1724.

* p. 232. Vol. 7.

‡ p. 236.

" 1 March

“ 1 *March* 1725. 23 *January*, and 20
 “ *August* 1726. 11 *May* 1728, and 17
 “ *January* 1729. So that nothing can be
 “ settled on that Subject.” There is ano-
 ther Paragraph of this which says, † “ As
 “ to what is due to you, which you make
 “ amount to some Millions of Dollars, we
 “ have reduced the whole *ad Statum li-*
 “ *quidi* to 667379 Rix Dollars by our Or-
 “ dinance of the 30th of *April* 1722, and
 “ 21 of *May* 1723.” By this we see plain-
 ly the Situation at that Time, between the
 Courts of *Hanover* and *Vienna*; which ac-
 counts too for all our other Transactions
 in foreign Affairs, even before the Treaty
 between *Spain* and the Emperor concluded
 at *Vienna*.

There is another Circumstance which
 shews, that the Opinion of the Emperor
 was altered in respect of the Duke of *Meck-*
lenburgh in 1720. For the Duke, in his
 Letter to the Diet of *Ratisbon*, says, * that
 “ in order to shew all possible Veneration
 “ and Submission for the Emperor, he did,
 “ in 1720, go in Person to *Vienna*, and
 “ lay before his Imperial Majesty the true
 “ State of his Affairs, in such a Manner,

† p. 235.

* p. 26. Vol. 7.

“ that soon after his Arrival in that Town,
 “ where he stayed seven Months, he was
 “ assured they had dispatched a Courier to
 “ the King of *Great-Britain*, and that
 “ they expected such Success from it, that
 “ he might have returned in Safety into
 “ his own Dominions.” ——— “ But the
 “ House of *Lunenburgh* had it principally
 “ in View, to render itself absolute in
 “ Lower *Saxony*, &c.” † “ Besides, pendi-
 “ ing the War with *Spain*, which then
 “ continued, his Imperial Majesty would
 “ not entirely quarrel with the House of
 “ *Lunenburgh*.”

‡ In 1726 the Duke of *Mecklenburgh*
 and the King of *Prussia* renew and extend
 the *Pactum perpetuum* between the Families
 as to the Succession of those Territories.

His *Prussian* Majesty's Interest was ob-
 vious not to have any Part of *Mecklen-
 burgh*, much less the whole gained to *Ha-
 nover*, under Pretence of mortgaging it for
 a greater Sum than it was worth, and an
 expensive Commission still eating up more
 of it.

† p. 27.

‡ p. 58.

Upon

Upon the Death of the late King, this Imperial Commission for *Mecklenburgh* ceased, and his present Majesty, by Means of the Duke of *Wolfenbuttle*, would have it renewed in his Person, but that being refused, and it being declared, that considering the King of *Prussia's* Interest, if the Commission was to be of the same kind, he should be one of them, which would have added more to the Expence: That the last Commission had not brought the Duke to Reason, and been an immense Charge to the Country, therefore, for the saving of that Expence, and for paying what was due, the Emperor, by a Decree dated the 11th of *May* 1728, suspends entirely the Government of the Country of *Mecklenburgh*, belonging to Duke *Charles Leopold*, and puts the same into the Hands of his Brother the Duke *Christian Louis*, as presumptive Heir. The granting this Administration of the Dutchy to Duke *Christian*, and the superseding of the *Hanover* Commission, no way suited with the Interests of *Hanover*, either as to the Design of eating it up, and seizing the Revenues of that Country for the present, or, of the retaining of it, or Part of it afterwards, upon Pretence of paying their Expences.

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By the Preliminaries signed at *Paris*, as well as the real Motives of the Quarrel with the Emperor, it seemed as if we should have agreed with him before we did with *Spain*, the Affairs of Lower *Saxony* and the North being the Touchstone of our Politics.

Accordingly, at the Congress at *Soissons* the Cardinal appeared as the Mediator of *Europe*, instead of us, who so lately had refused the sole Mediation between the Emperor and *Spain*, because of *German* Contests, seemed to have a Partiality to the Views of *Hanover* in respect of *Mecklenburgh* in two Points: The one was, that the Emperor could not, according to the Laws of the Empire, grant the Administration to Duke *Christian*; the other, that the former Commission granted to the late Elector of *Hanover* did not cease by his Death; the Consequence of which would be, that the same Designs and Views might be carried on and perfected for *Hanover*. To clear this Point, and set this Affair right with the Cardinal, a Deduction of this Affair of *Mecklenburgh* was made * to

* Roussel Vol. 7. p. 6.

serve as Instructions to the Baron *de Fonseca* at the Congress that was to be held, by which the Injustice of the *Hanover* Pretensions fully appear. The Emperor had not the proper Condescensions necessary to conclude any Thing at this Congress, which was in *June* 1729. The State of Affairs in *Germany* and the North being extremely altered since the signing of the *Vienna* and *Hanover* Treaties in 1725, the King of *Prussia*, who had signed the latter, had soon left it, and was now thoroughly sensible of his Interest in *Mecklenburgh*, and had even renewed and extended the Family Compact between him and that Duke by a Treaty in 1726, whose Interest it was that neither the whole, nor any Part should be eaten up by an irredeemable Mortgage; and the Emperor was entirely united with *Russia*, which acceded to the *Vienna* Treaty in 1726. the Emperor acceding, at the same Time, to the Treaty of *Stockholm* between *Sweden* and *Russia*, concluded in 1724, in which there was a secret Article relating to the Duke of *Holstein* and the Affairs of *Sleswick*. This, as well as the Affair of *Mecklenburgh*, and the secret Treaty of *Madrid* in 1721, after what had passed in relation to all these Transactions in 1720, shews why *Hanover* did not care

for the sole Mediation between the Emperor and *Spain* after sending back the Infanta, and should be so angry at the *Vienna* Treaty of 1725, and so rejoiced in making the *Hanover* Treaty the same Year, since *France* was the only Power that could assist and protect it in it's View in the North. But *France* not being able to obtain any Thing for it in the Congress of *Soissons*, the Treaty of *Seville* was concluded a few Months afterwards, by which *England* was plunged into farther Difficulties and Expences, without obtaining any Thing really for itself. But the Emperor was robbed of that Ally, and was to be forced, by us, to part with his Power in *Italy* to that our new Ally. However, neither this, nor all the Threats that were used, could humble the Emperor into any Condescensions to the Views of *Hanover* in *Germany*, which, therefore, at last permitted *England* to conclude a Treaty with the Emperor at *Vienna* in 1731. I will not, at present, say any Thing of what passed there relating to the Interests of *Hanover* and *England*, and will only observe, in order to conclude this Affair of *Mecklenburgh*, that *Hanover* being mightily fallen in it's Views, it appears that in 1732,
by

by the Imperial Resolution and Instruction concerning *Mecklenburgh**, there was allowed, due to the Elector of *Hanover* upon the former Commission, only 789856 Rix Dollars, which are promised to be paid by the Imperial Guarantee, and that certain Lands shall be mortgaged for that Purpose; and that *Hanover* might keep 3 or 400 Soldiers there till the same was paid. What has been done in this Affair since has not come to my Knowledge, having only seen in the News-Papers this Summer, that the *Hanover* Troops had been drawn out of that Country, and that their Place was supplied by *Prussians*.

Let the impartial World judge from this short State of this long Affair, whether the Views of *Hanover* upon *Mecklenburgh* have had any Influence upon our foreign Transactions or not.

I now come to prove, that the Drift of this Book is not only, not Jacobite, but that it is loyal and salutary to the present Royal Family.

I know nothing that a Jacobite would advise, or ought to wish so much, as that

* *Roussset*, Vol. 7. p. 287, and 290.

the

the present Royal Family should pursue such Measures as would lose them the Affections of the Nation in general; and I know nothing that would more effectually attain that End, than the Sacrifice of the Wealth and Interest of *Great-Britain* to the narrow Views and petty Concerns of a *German* Electorate. Those only, therefore, who promote or who do not prevent such Measures, act the Jacobite Part, not those who loyally and honestly represent against and expose them. But, say some, this Book asserts, that such Measures have been constantly pursued ever since the Accession of the present Royal Family, *ergo*, it is Criminal, it is Jacobite. Both our Constitution and our Reason draw a very different Conclusion from this Principle. Our Constitution very wisely tells us, that the King can do no Wrong, but that his Ministers may and are accountable for it: And our common Sense tells us, that the present Royal Family would never have acted so obviously contrary to their most essential Interests, if they had been truly informed, and honestly advised, instead of being perfidiously flattered and deceived. If such Measures have been pursued, the best Service, that can be done to the Royal Family, is to expose those Measures now, and

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prevent them hereafter. Connivance and Concealment are not the Means of Prevention: Truth should be made known, and it should be known to those whom it most imports to know it. Otherwise I make no doubt but the Royal Family will some Time or other be addressed in this Manner.

The Interests of Hanover and England are not only consistent but reciprocally connected together. This is plain to those who understand foreign Affairs; none but Bunglers think otherwise. Extend your foreign Dominions, though at the Expence of England, and the Figure I will make you make upon the Continent shall more than repay it. Sovereign of both, whatever you add to either, you add to both: All Men of Sense think so, and I'll undertake the Parliament shall think so too.

Such captivating Language, supported by strong Assertions and bold Promises, may easily mislead, and no Doubt has misled the best-meaning Princes in the World, and would continue to do so, if the Voice of their People did not inform them better, and drown the Voice of such pernicious Flatterers. Are the Actions of an Administration not to be blamed, nor exposed, because

the present Royal Family should pursue such Measures as would lose them the Affections of the Nation in general; and I know nothing that would more effectually attain that End, than the Sacrifice of the Wealth and Interest of *Great-Britain* to the narrow Views and petty Concerns of a *German* Electorate. Those only, therefore, who promote or who do not prevent such Measures, act the Jacobite Part, not those who loyally and honestly represent against and expose them. But, say some, this Book asserts, that such Measures have been constantly pursued ever since the Accession of the present Royal Family, *ergo*, it is Criminal, it is Jacobite. Both our Constitution and our Reason draw a very different Conclusion from this Principle. Our Constitution very wisely tells us, that the King can do no Wrong, but that his Ministers may and are accountable for it: And our common Sense tells us, that the present Royal Family would never have acted so obviously contrary to their most essential Interests, if they had been truly informed, and honestly advised, instead of being perfidiously flattered and deceived. If such Measures have been pursued, the best Service, that can be done to the Royal Family, is to expose those Measures now, and

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because of that Ministerial Inference, that therefore the Crown must have been in the Wrong? What unheard of Doctrine is this! Whereas the Principle of this Constitution is, that the Measures of the Administration are always to be examined; and, if they deserve it, censured and punished. And the Inference is, that the Administration only, and not the Crown, has done wrong. But with what Face can those who were either the Authors or the Abettors of every Book, Pamphlet, or Speech made or published against all the Measures of the late Administration, during the Course of twenty Years, brand with the Infamy of Jacobitism a Disapprobation of their own Conduct, since their Situation and their Principles (if they had any) have been changed? Such an Insinuation is as shameless as it is false; and thank God it is false! otherwise there would be eight Millions of Jacobites at this Time in this Kingdom.

The Excise was a Measure public enough, and but too publicly espoused by the Crown misinformed; the dangerous Nature and Consequences of it were explained and exposed to the Nation in various Pamphlets, and Speeches with such Success, that the Measure was defeated, and, I believe, prevented

vented for ever hereafter. But did the supposed Author of that Measure, against whom all those Performances were particularly directed, ever presume to make this impudent Syllogism, You expose and attack a Measure avowedly espoused by the Crown, *ergo*, you are for changing the Head that wears it? He never did, which, without Offence, I must ascribe more to his Sense than his Modesty.

Besides, what does this Book discover that was not known before? Were our fluctuating Measures, our contradictory Treaties for and against *Sweden*, for and against *Russia*, for and against the House of *Austria*, unknown to any informed Man of the Kingdom, or the true Motives of them Secrets to any discerning one? What then does this Book do? Why, it makes a Deduction of them, states them in a clear Light, in which irresistible Truth appears, a Truth which it highly imports the Royal Family and the whole Nation to know.

I believe I need not use many Arguments to prove, that the Intention of the Book is honest and meritorious to the Public.

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It will easily be granted me, that we ought, as far as possible, to enjoy the Advantage Nature has bestowed upon us of being an Island, and consequently to keep as free as we can from all the Quarrels of the Continent. Had this Maxim been pursued from the Time of the Accession of the present Royal Family, I dare say, I speak within Compass when I assert, that above half, if not two third Parts of the national Debt had been now discharged, and the Millions raised by the Salt-Tax, and the many Millions more raised by the Land-Tax, exceeding two Shillings in the Pound, would have been saved to the Public. Whereas the Interests of *Hanover* are of a direct contrary Nature. As our Security arises from our being an Island, the Danger of *Hanover* arises from it's being upon the Continent, and surrounded by Princes infinitely more powerful. *Hanover* views them with Fear and Envy: They view *Hanover* with some Jealousy, not of it's own, but of the *British* Strength, which they see devolved to it. *Hanover* wants to extend itself, in Order to be nearer a Match for it's Neighbours, which they are determined to prevent if they can. These Circumstances must eternally, for the future, as they have

have done for the Time past, fatally involve us in all the Affairs of the Continent, unless the Spirit of the Nation well informed, and the Virtue of an *English* Parliament shew our Princes the Imprudence of pursuing such Measures, and our Ministers the Danger of advising or executing them.

The Love of our native Country is a natural, a becoming Sentiment; and nobody can blame it in the Royal Family; but let *Englishmen* be indulged in the same Sentiment too, and would to God it were more common among us. No-body could or did wonder at the Partiality his late Majesty expressed for his native Country, and no-body blames the Tenderness his present Majesty preserves for it. Both of them received their Beings and their first Impressions there. Nor would it be surprizing, if the Successor should have some Prædilection for that Meridian in which he was born and educated. But though these Sentiments are not blameable in them, they are, upon the same Principle, to be looked upon with a jealous Eye by us. Their Effects are to be guarded against, and Ministers ought to be convinced, that they shall not with Impunity flatter those Sentiments,

ments, to the draining and enslaving this Country.

Shall it be said, that this Doctrine is the most dangerous that ever was propagated, and that it is sowing the Seeds of perpetual Discord between the Crown and the People? I deny it, and ask, whether it is for the Advantage of this Royal Family to be lulled by a temporary Acquiescence into a fatal Opinion, that such Measures are either not seen through or approved of, which would infallibly be the Ministerial Interpretation put upon such Acquiescence; or to be timely warned against their own Partiality, and those who would flatter it? And whether any greater Mischiefs can arise from this terrible Doctrine than those of being a pecuniary Province to a little State upon the Continent, destined only to bolster up it's Pride, supply it's Indigence, and gratify it's frivolous Ambition?

I come now to prove, that the Tendency of this Book is useful to every Minister who does not intend to sacrifice the Interests of *Great-Britain* to private Favour in the Closet. Such a one will be glad to be armed with these Arguments, to combat the natural and blameless Partiality of

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his Prince. When he can say, Sir, these Things are now too well understood, and too warmly entertained by the whole Nation, to be either attempted or compassed: They can no longer be made to believe, that a Squabble in Lower *Saxony* interests *Great-Britain*, nor be prevailed upon to take Part in it. Will you lose the Affections, and exhaust the Strength of your Kingdom, for the Addition of a Bailliage to your Electorate? I say, when a Minister is enabled to hold this Language in the Closet, the Prudence and Justice of his Prince (at least, I am sure, of the Prince now upon the Throne) will interpose in his Behalf, and check the rising Sentiments of natal Partiality and Fondness.

He will consider his two Dominions as two Children, who have both Claims to his Care and Affection; but his Prudence will tell him, not to endeavour to raise the one upon the Ruins of the other. Much more, not to lavish away upon a puny, hopeless, and stunted Child, the Nourishment necessary to support the healthy and thriving one.

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The Conclusion of the Book gives great Offence, and the Division of the People of this Kingdom, into *Hanoverians* and *Englishmen*, is represented as a most dangerous, malicious and seditious Distinction. For my own part, I cannot see what gentler Appellation, the Authors, or Supporters of *Hanoverian* Measures, directly inconsistent with the Interest of *Great-Britain*, can claim, or be distinguished by. A much harder, in my Mind, might, with Justice, be given them; and the Jacobite fairly retorted. Those therefore, who to gain Favour or Money, promote such dangerous Measures, as must be the constant Source of Dissatisfaction between this Royal Family and the Nation, are surely the greatest Enemies to both. And those the best Friends to both, who by shewing how incompatible the Interests of the Electorate are with those of *Great-Britain*, may suggest the prudent and necessary Measure of separating the Dominions themselves, in favour of a younger Branch of this Royal Family, and supplying that great Defect in the Act of Settlement, which every Body now wishes, had been originally provided for, and wonders

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ders was not. This Expedient would not only tend to the Security and Advantage of both Countries, but would confirm and secure this Royal Family upon this Throne, by the Gratitude and Affections of their People.

The famous Maxim of *divide et impera* was never so true, as it would prove in this Case. The Separation of those Dominions would be the uniting of these in zeal and Duty, for that Prince of this Royal Family, who shall be well enough advised, or wise enough of himself to do what, one Day or other, will and must be done.

Having now done with the Book, I cannot help (since I am upon this important Subject) adding some Facts, and some Observations, not hitherto mentioned, with regard to the 16000 *Hanoverians* lately taken into *British* Pay; and taking Notice of some Arguments made use of to justify that Measure.

I must confess that, when a whole Plan is so fundamentally wrong, and so clearly impracticable, as the present Plan for the Assistance of the Queen of *Hungary* seems to be; it is trifling and frivolous to enter
into

into a Dispute upon any particular Part of it; but since it is universally owned in private, and not strongly denied in publick, that the general Measure is wrong; though in Consequence of that Measure, the taking of 16000 *Hanoverians* into our Pay is said to be right; I shall consider that Point now, though in truth it is losing the main Object, and descending to a Trifle, when compared with the great, expensive, dangerous and impracticable Plan now pursuing.

1st. Then I assert, that the giving the Queen of *Hungary* that Sum in Money, which the *Hanoverian* Troops will cost us, would have been of much greater Service to her than those Troops can be, which cannot serve where she has most Occasion for them: And perhaps her Ministers have declared as much.

2dly. If it was or is necessary to have 16000 Men more in *Flanders*, than we first sent there (which I deny) I assert that we could have spared them, and in Prudence, ought to have furnished them out of our own Army at home. For what Occasion can there be to keep them here, for Guards and Garrisons, 23000 Men,
besides

besides the greatest Part of 11550 Marines; when *France* is said to be so low, that *England* alone, without Allies, is an Overmatch for her. How these Troops then are to be employed here, has not yet been declared, possibly is not yet determined.

3dly. The *Hanover* Troops are the Troops of an Elector, who gave his Vote for the present Emperor at his Election, which Emperor was then actually in Possession of some, and claimed the greatest Part of the Dominions of the House of *Austria*, in Consequence of which, he is exposed to the Ban of the Empire if he acts against him. The Law of the Empire says, *Qui quâcunque de causâ, vel sub quocunque prætextu, aliquem armis oppugnat, spoliât, obsidet, de possessione dejicit, Banno afficiatur*. But say some, the Pragmatic Sanction being registred in the Imperial Diet, becomes a Law, and authorizes the Assistance given by an Elector to the Queen of *Hungary*. How vain is that Dependence, how dangerous the Experiment, for a little Elector, when it was of no Avail to the Queen of *Hungary* herself: And when the very Person who was possessed of some, and acquiring more of her Dominions, was unanimously elected Emperor,

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ror, and had the Vote of that very Elector, who must plead in his own Justification the Pragmatick Sanction, after it is entirely laid aside? And has not the Election of the Emperor, under those Circumstances, together with the Grant of fifty Roman Months from the Empire, acknowledged the Justice of his Cause, the Part the Empire took in it, and, in effect, cancelled the Pragmatick Sanction? Nay, if even the *Hanover* Troops would act in the Empire under these Circumstances, is it advisable for *England* that they should; since if Victory, (which will decide this Point of Law) should declare against them, the Elector is laid under the Ban, and the Electorate put to Fire and Sword; in which Case, one may presume *England* would be called upon for Indemnification?

4thly. To consider the *Hanover* Troops with regard to the Neutrality. That Neutrality, I am told, has been declared authentically, by a Person in a high Station, to be indefinite: Which Word, indefinite, must imply both Duration and Extent. As the Time then is unlimited, it must be understood to refer to the End of the Affairs then in Dispute. And as to it's Extent; as it was granted to supplicating *Hanover*

nover for it's immediate Preservation, the Condition of the Obligation must have been, that *Hanover* should not, in any manner or Place, act against the Emperor, in favour of the Queen of *Hungary*. *France* as an Auxiliary of the Emperor's had sent an Army into *Westphalia* to hinder *Hanover* from assisting the Queen of *Hungary*; and it cannot be supposed, that that Army was withdrawn singly at the Entreaty of the trembling Electorate, without an express Condition, that upon their withdrawing, what they were sent there to prevent should not afterwards be done.

5thly. The Distinction of their being the mercenary Troops of *England*, and as such, at Liberty to act any where; may be of home Use at present, in order to impose upon the Nation, but will be treated with Contempt by all Powers abroad: Nor will *Hanover* venture it's Safety upon so poor an Equivocation: And their Self-Preservation makes them the worst foreign Troops we could hire. The only Assistance too they can pretend to give the Queen of *Hungary*, must be upon the Foot of another Equivocation, that, of not attacking the Emperor directly, but only entering into that Part of *Germany* which does not be-

long to him, and preventing the *French* from passing the *Rhine*, and sending more Succours to *Bavaria*: But how insufficient this Distinction, or rather Quibble, will prove, appears from the Complaint already made by the Imperial Minister, of the Breach of the Constitutions of the Empire, by the quartering only of some of these *Hanover* Troops at *Liege*.

6thly. As the Electorate of *Hanover* has in all it's former Conventions cautiously stipulated, that it's Troops should not be sent too far from home, and should be at Liberty even to return home, in case of Danger threatened to the Electorate; it is not to be supposed that it will be less cautious upon this Occasion; which Caution must necessarily have too great an Influence upon the Operations of the War. It is asserted indeed, that the *Hanoverians* shall act wherever the *English* shall be directed to act; which I verily believe to be true, because I am convinced, that the *English* will only be directed to act where the *Hanoverians* may act, if they can act at all.

That Consideration will ever be predominant, and the whole Spirit of the *English* Orders will be but an Extract of the
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separate Interest or Danger of *Hanover*. That such were the cautious Maxims of that Electorate in the last War appears in *Lamberty* Vol. 2. page 645. Those Troops in 1703 not having joined the Prince of *Hesse*, as required, and having refused to march with him to raise the Siege of *Landau*, upon Pretence that it would carry them too far from home, the Prince was beaten and the Town taken. The Electorate of *Hanover* thought it necessary to make an Apology for their Conduct: But says *Lamberty*, notwithstanding this Apology, their refusing to march, joined to the Affair of the Battle of *Landen*, in the late War, has ever since prejudiced every Body against these Troops. Upon all other Occasions, and particularly in the Battle of *Malplaquet*, the *States General* were extremely angry at them, *Monsieur d'Almelo* having writ them Word, that he had told General *Bulau*, he should be answerable for any Misfortune that happened since he refused to march. And indeed the *Lunenburg* Ministers appeared but little in publick, and did not come to the Congress, fearing the cruel Reproaches they expected to meet with.

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But admitting the Necessity (which I absolutely deny) of hiring any foreign Troops at all; it is said that the *Hanoverians* were the properest, and even the only ones we could get.

If they are the only ones, what a Condition are we in, and how prudent the Plan we are now engaged in, of restoring the House of *Austria*, not only without one Ally in the World, but without being able to find any one Prince in *Europe*, except the Elector of *Hanover*, who will even condescend to take our Money? But by this Time, I believe, the Engagement of a considerable Number of other Mercenaries in our Pay proves the contrary. And as to their being the most desirable, I can by no Means agree, though I can see many Reasons why they were the most desired by some People. If the taking them was the Price of Favour, the dismissing them will never be a Step to it; and consequently will be taken as late as possible, so that we are likely to keep them in our Pay longer than any others whatsoever.

They will also (after this Precedent) be put upon us oftner than any others; for

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being always ready at *Hanover*, it will be an easy and cheap Experiment to take a Number of them into our Pay, upon some Pretence or other, in the Intervals of Parliament, and if Parliament afterwards approves, it is so much clear Gain; if not, there's nothing lost by the Attempt.

Having thus shewn, that these *Hanoverian* Troops are not only the most improper Troops we could hire, but even absolutely useless for the Purposes for which they are pretended to be taken, I shall now consider this Matter in some other Lights.

It is well known, that the Electorate of *Hanover*, as a contracting Party to the Guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, is obliged to support it with a certain Contingent, and *totis viribus*, if necessary.

It is well known too, that *Hanover* augmented it's Forces with 6000 Men upon the Death of the Emperor, and upon the King of *Prussia*'s invading *Silesia*; which it must have done either in Consequence of those Engagements; or else, (what can hardly be supposed) in Order to acquire a Share of the King of *Prussia*'s Dominions,
upon

upon the Foot of a certain Plan for the Partition of them.

If then *Hanover* could, at that Time, act, and be at such an Expence either for it's own Views, or the Sake of the common Cause, why can it not afford something at least towards it now? If *Hanover* was not an Ally, what Occasion was there for the Address of Parliament, *April* the 8th, 1741, in which they assure his Majesty, that they will stand by and support him against all Insults and Attacks which any Prince or Power, in Resentment of the just and prudent Measures which his Majesty has so wisely taken, shall make upon any of his Majesty's Territories or Dominions, though not belonging to the Crown of *Great-Britain*. And what Truth was there in the Argument upon which that Address was founded, *viz.* That as Elector, he was an Ally in the same Cause, and therefore to be supported? And if *Hanover* be an Ally, why does it, in no one single Instance, act the Part of one? or fulfil any Engagement? There can be no Doubt, but that the Parliament last Year thought *Hanover* one of the Powers they might depend upon, and implied, in the memorable Resolution of the 23d of *March* last, which
says;

says; that as the late favourable Turn of Affairs affords reasonable Grounds to hope, that if the Queen of *Hungary* is timely and properly assisted by those Powers who are engaged by Treaties, and bound by Interest to support her, the Balance of Power may be restored. But if *Hanover* be not comprehended within this Description, then the early Preparations it made, and the Zeal it expressed at first, to attack the King of *Prussia*, can only be ascribed to it's own separate Views, and to execute the famous Plan disclaimed with Horror by the Queen of *Hungary*, of dismembering and sharing the Dominions of that Prince. And how hard is our Case, if we are now to act not only without it's Assistance, but even to expend Millions for a Pretence to repay the Electorate what it had disbursed for it's own separate and private Views only?

We have already seen how the various Plans for enlarging and extending the Dominions of the Electorate have directed all our foreign Transactions, ever since the Crown of *Great-Britain* has been added to it. But those Plans having proved of late unsuccessful, we are now to enrich the Dominions we cannot enlarge, and *Hanover* is one Way or another to get by what-

ever we do. Prudence therefore suggests to us, to contract ourselves within ourselves, and not to meddle with the Affairs of the Continent, while we are annexed to foreign Dominions, whose Interests are to direct our Measures, or exhaust our Wealth.

The best and truest Friends to this Royal Family have long lamented, and still lament, that by the Act of Settlement the *Hanover* Dominions were not originally separated from those of *Great-Britain*. The Reasons why that was not done at that Time by the Parliament, cannot now be exactly known; but it appears, that they had Apprehensions of our losing the Benefit of being an Island, and therefore inserted the Clause, that *England* should not be engaged in any Wars upon the Continent upon the Account of *Hanover*. Which Clause, if it had never been evaded, nor the other, of the King's not going abroad, without Consent of Parliament, repealed, Time would insensibly have worn out those Prejudices, which divide the Interests of the two Dominions, and the lesser would have been, according to all true Policy, absorbed in the greater, or willingly parted with to a younger Branch of the Royal Family; which is now what we have alone
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to hope for, and which makes it the Duty of every loyal Subject, and Lover of his Country, to explain the past and present Transactions with Regard to *Hanover*, thereby to prevent the like for the future, make it more willingly be parted with, and hinder it from being a Ministerial Bait to catch Favour in the Closet.

The extraordinary Sum demanded for these *Hanover* Troops, is still more astonishing than even any other of the Circumstances that attend them, and plainly proves, that all we are now doing upon the Continent, is only for a Pretence to give that very Sum. As it is a Master-piece of it's Kind, it shall be fully considered and detected, and it will then, I am persuaded, open the Eyes of the most deceived, and most sanguine Believers, in our imaginary Efforts upon the Continent for restoring the House of *Austria*. In Order to do this, it will be necessary to consider, and begin with the Convention of 1702, for hiring 10,000 *Hanover* Troops to act for the Grand Alliance in the last War.

By that Convention, their Pay was upon the same Foot as at present ; but with this Difference, that as their Horse exceeded the

Number stipulated, that exceeding was only to be paid as Infantry. The Pay for General Officers, was only for one Lieutenant General, and one Major General; the Pretence of paying for Officers of a Train of Artillery was not then imposed upon us; nor was there any Allowance made by the Treaty, or the Establishment, for the ordinary Recruits of Horse and Foot. They had neither any Hopes or Promise of extraordinary Pay, nor was there any Levymoney paid, or Subsidy given, and the Convention, signed on the 21st of *June*, declares, that Part of those Troops was already arrived at the appointed Place of Action, *viz.* the *Lower Rhine*, notwithstanding which their Pay was only to commence on the first of *June*, and end the first of *January* following, which seven Months were in Effect the whole Campaign, whereas we are now to pay sixteen Months for but one Campaign, if even that.

Now to compare the present Bargain with this; at a Time when the Nation has no Assistance from the Crown for the carrying on the War, as it had in the late Queen's Time, we shall find that *Hanover*, though united to *England*, and not giving the least Assistance in a War, in which it
has

has involved both *England* and *Europe*, insists upon much harder Terms from us, than ever it did before, and treats us as a pecuniary Province, from whence their Demands are implicitly to be satisfied.

By the present Demand of Pay for 16000 *Hanoverians*, we are to pay for one General, two Lieutenant Generals, three Major Generals, four Brigadier Generals, one Aid de Camp, four Aids de Camp, ten Aids de Camp, two Majors of Brigade of Horse, and two Majors of Brigade of Foot (for thus they stand with these Repetitions in the Estimates) whose Pay, from the 31st of *August* 1742, to the 26th of *December* 1743, amounts to 19,132 *l*.

We are to pay for a Troop of Horse Guards, the same as a whole Regiment of their Horse costs, though the Troop of Guards is but half in Number of Men, which is so much clear Loss to us, for the Sake of the Parade only.

We are likewise to pay for Officers and Men belonging to the Train, for the same Time 12,935 *l*. a new Article, entirely gained to *Hanover*. And we are to pay Recruit-Money for both Horse and Foot,
for

for the same Time, amounting to the Sum of 19,658 *l.* a new Article, till now unheard of in the hiring of Troops, which is not even allowed to our own Army; and which has always been provided for by the Deficiency of the Men, that must inevitably be lost and missing in a Campaign, and would be a Saving to the same Amount, if the Respites were not taken off, but allowed for the Recruits, as has been, and always must be the Practice. This, therefore, is either a manifest Partiality to the *Hanover* Troops, or an unjustifiable Increase of the *Hanover* Treasures.

By the Convention of 1702, a certain fixed Number of Guilders and Stivers was to be paid at stated Times at *Rotterdam*, for the Hire of those *Hanover* Forces. And they had nothing to do with the Pound Sterling in *England*, by which Means the Public here had the Advantage of the Exchange; but by the present extraordinary Bargain, no Place is appointed where these Troops are to receive their Pay, and Levy-Money, but the Payment is to be in Pounds Sterling, at ten Guilders ten Stivers to a Pound Sterling: And in Consequence of that 657,888 *l.* Sterling are to be given and granted to his Majesty for the Pay of these Troops (Levy-Money included) from the

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the 31st of *August* 1742, to the 25th of *December* 1743; which will be received here, by whomsoever his Majesty shall appoint to receive it for him, as Elector of *Hanover*; and the Disposal of it afterwards cannot be under the Controul, and Methods of accounting, which are established here in *England*; but the Elector of *Hanover* may, and will remit abroad, or do what else he pleases with the Whole or any Part of it. Therefore the computing the Exchange at present, to be but ten Guilders ten Stivers to a Pound Sterling, is a manifest Injustice to *England*; since one Pound Sterling now remitted abroad, at the present Course of the Exchange, would produce there ten Guilders and eighteen Stivers, which is a Loss to us; and a Gain, to somebody of other, of eight Stivers on every Pound Sterling, which is about four *per Cent.* and amounts in the Whole to 26000*l.* The Money now remitted to *Flanders* by a very disadvantageous Contract, for the Pay of the *English* Troops there, is still much higher, and more for the Advantage of *England* than this.

It must likewise be remembered, that in the last War, a Deduction of two and a half *per Cent.* was made upon all the Money
then

then paid to the *Hanover* Troops, to be applied to the Services of the War. But as they are now his Majesty's own Troops, and yet have the same Pay they had in the last War, that Deduction will likewise be saved, which amounts to 16447 *l*.

Moreover, as in 1702 the Pay of the *Hanoverians* commenced but on the first of *June*, at which Time many of them were already arrived at the Place appointed, and all the others actually upon their March to it; one Month's Pay might surely have been reasonably saved now to the Publick, since these Troops only marched in *October* into *Flanders* to their Winter Quarters, which Month's Pay would have been a saving of 32,250 *l*.

But the most extraordinary Article of all is the Levy-Money we are made to pay for these Troops amounting to 139313 *l*. when the *Hanover* Troops in 1702 had neither Levy-Money, nor Subsidies, and when it is well known, that the 6000 additional Men, raised at *Hanover* upon the Death of the Emperor, were raised singly, for the private and separate Views of the Electorate. This surely is at least unfriendly Usage of us. Even the *Hessians*

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in 1726 contracted to maintain 12000 Men in Readiness to march for our Service for two Years, of which very Number 3000 Foot, and 2000 Horse were to be raised, and we were to pay them no more than 125000 *l.* for levying 5000 Men, and keeping the whole 12000 Men in Readiness for our Service two Years. What Proportion does this bear to the Price we are now to pay, for the Troops of an Electorate united to *England*, engaged as an Ally in the same Cause, and one of those Powers described by his Majesty, as engaged by Treaties and bound by Interest, to support the Queen of *Hungary*. And since we must have these *Hanoverian* Troops, why are we not to have them upon as easy Terms, and in every Article as cheap as in the Year 1702? We had them then without Subsidy or Levy-Money. Their Pay did not commence till they marched. We paid them but seven Months for one Campaign instead of sixteen, I will not answer myself this Question; may be the World will. But I will only observe, the Difference of the Conduct of *Hanover* then, and of *Hanover* now, which, far from being contented with saving the whole Pay of these 16000 Men at home, insists upon making over and above such an immense Profit by such a Number of

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extraordinary Articles as no subsidiary Ally ever before presumed to ask.

We feel, we know the Reason, why our Debts have not been lessened, or even two Thirds of them paid off, since 1716, and we know that the only War or Expence that this Nation has been engaged in for it's own Interests, is, the present War with *Spain*; but we see that those who engaged us in it, for the Sake of succeeding to the Places and Power of those they hoped to ruin by it, have no sooner obtained the former, and a very little of the latter, but they totally neglect it; and only pay their Court, and lay, as they hope, the Foundation of their future Power upon the avowed and undistinguishd Design of enriching *Hanover*, by the most extravagant Scheme, as to Affairs of the Continent, that ever was exposd to this Nation. Such gross and expensive Flattery, such Sacrifices of the Interest and Wealth of this Nation, to favour in the Closet, must render us contemptible abroad, create Dissatisfaction at home, and excite Jealousies, even in our own Army. Why is the *Hanover* Army to equal in every respect the *English* Army abroad? (besides many particular Advantages and Preferences given them

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them over and above) a long Roll of General Officers, Horse-Guards, a Train of Artillery, the equal Number of 16000 Men, that it may tally in every respect with the *English*, whose Jealousy of the Comparison will be heightened, not by the superior Reputation of Horse Troops; but by their being paid with *English* Money, besides the extraordinary Additions of Levy and Recruit Money, which they have not, whereby they will have so many fewer of their own Countrymen, on whom they could and would more chearfully depend in any Action.

What must foreign Powers think of us, with regard to the present War on the Continent? when they see, that the only Dispute here, is, to support and supply the Queen of *Hungary*, in a more effectual manner, than the Ministers are willing to do, who pretend, at our Expence alone, to restore the House of *Austria*, to be a Balance to that of *Bourbon*; but who in truth mean only to make their Court, by taking *Hanover* Troops to the Detriment of the Queen of *Hungary*, who, in another way, would be much more effectually supplied. The late War they well remember was carried on against *France*, by the united Voice

of the Parliament and the Nation; the contrary is now the Case, the Court Intrigue appears through the Whole, and every Body sees how little the Interest of the Nation has been considered, or rather how grossly it has been sacrificed, to the Avarice or the Ambition of some few Individuals.

At home it will easily be conceived, that though a Cabinet Council consisting of such who, it was well known, would advise his Majesty to take 16000 *Hanoverians* into his Pay, and march them, at that Time of the Year, into *Flanders* for the Service of this Island, had advised his Majesty to this Measure; yet it will not be supposed, that the Expence, and the several extraordinary Demands for that pretended Service, could have been communicated to them, much less could have been approved of by them. That was of too dangerous a Nature for them to meddle with, and even this Parliament would never have suffered it: But who the Minister was that advised these extraordinary Demands for *Hanover*, without any Persons being charged with the Care of the Interest of this Country, in the settling of them, the Nation is not at a
Loss

Loss to know, though it may want judicial Evidence to prove at present.

At home too will be considered our many Years Peace, our immense Expences abroad, and the Cause of them; the Ruin of the House of *Austria*; the vast undiminished Debt we labour under; the Poverty and Necessities of this Country; the Willingness of supporting the Queen of *Hungary* as far as possible; the Absurdity of pretending alone to restore the House of *Austria*; the total Neglect of the War in the *West Indies* for the Security of our Trade and Navigation: All these Circumstances, I say, will be considered at home, and not without Surprise and Indignation, that *Hanover*, the principal Cause of these Misfortunes, should at the same Time, instead of acting as an Ally in the Support of the common Cause, make it's Troops the most mercenary and most expensive Troops to *England* that ever were hired by this Kingdom.

While we are doing nothing against *Spain* in our own War, the Expence of this Nation will this Year vastly exceed the Expence of any one Year of the late War, when we had such great Armies employed in

in several Places abroad. We are doing nothing now on the Continent but spending our Money, we have 16000 *English*, 16000 *Hanoverians*, and 6000 *Hessians*, in all 38000 Men, for that Purpose, which are to cost us 1,087,000 *l.* besides which we shall have farther Demands from the *Hanover* Troops, which are not yet publicly avowed, such as, extraordinary Pay, Douceurs, Forage and Waggon-Money, all which future Demands will no Doubt be reasonable, in the same Proportion as those we already know, and have complied with.

The Expence of 50,000 Men, voted for *Flanders*, in the Year 1703, was but 1,012,000 *l.* by which it appears, that we were to have 12000 Men more than we have now, and for 75000 *l.* less Money. The whole Service of that Year, both at home and abroad, as voted by Parliament, amounted only to 3,694,136 *l.* which is not half what this Year's Expence will amount to, and yet how little will or can be done by it?

Exhausted and beggared we are already! A servile Submission, and the breaking and taming of the true *English* Spirit, may possibly

sibly be thought the next Thing necessary ; in Order to which, the Interests and Influence of *Hanover* are no longer to be disguised or concealed, but openly avowed, as the Rule of our Conduct, and the Spring of our Actions.

If these are but the Blossoms of the late boasted Change of Men and Measures, Blossoms stained too with the deepest public and private Perfidy ; what are the Fruits we must expect, or rather dread from them ? Power is and must be maintained by the same Means, by which it is acquired : And if we are to judge by the Price now paid for a very small Share of it, what will be the Purchase of the Remainder ? and the Consequences of that Bargain ? But these Considerations may possibly account for the keeping so great an Army at home, instead of sending 16000 more of them abroad, in the Room of so many *Hanoverians*, who can't, won't, nor ought not to act.



The

The Estimates for the Year 1703.

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|--------------------------|----------|
| For 40000 Seamen | 2,080000 |
| Ordinary of the Navy | 129314 |
| For 40000 Land-Forces | 833826 |
| For 10000 Additional | 178180 |
| For Guards and Garrisons | 350000 |
| Subsides to Allies | 51843 |
| Ordinance | 70973 |

 3,694136
**F I N I S.**